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PAST THE TIPPING POINT: REFORMING THE ROLE OF
WILLFULNESS IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DOCTRINE OF
ENHANCED DAMAGES FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT

Scott Bloebaum'
The Federal Circuit's recent decision in In re Seagate
Technology, L.L.C. modified the standardfor determining whether
a patent has been infringed willfully, but left intact the existing
doctrine that requires willfulness to justify enhanced damages
under 35 U.S.C. § 284. This Comment presents several arguments
as to why the current enhanced damages doctrine should be
modified. The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C. on the availability of injunctive relief
under 35 U.S. C. § 283 provides strong support to these arguments.
Finally, the authorproposes a flexible enhanced damages doctrine
and compares it with a legislative solution currently being
consideredby Congress.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Federal Circuit's recent opinion in In re Seagate
Technology, L.L.C. 2 significantly modified the standard for
determining whether infringement of a patent was willful? The
significance of this determination is that the Federal Circuit, in its
main line of cases, has interpreted willfulness as a necessary rather
than a sufficient condition for awarding enhanced damages under
1J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2009. The
author wishes to thank Jeffrey W. Childers of Alston & Bird, L.L.P. and Daniel
P. Homiller of Coats & Bennett, P.L.L.C. for their valuable comments and
critiques on the substance and form of this Comment. The author also wishes to
thank the members of the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology editorial
staff who reviewed drafts of this Comment for their valuable suggestions. The
author reserves his deepest gratitude, however, for his wife, Nancy, and
children, Elena and Adam, for their support while he was writing this Comment.
2 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
3
Id. at 1371.
139
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35 U.S.C. § 284.4 This enhanced damages doctrine has been
controversial and inconsistently applied since its origin, with a
main source of the controversy being conflicting views as to the
purpose of enhanced damages.' As Judge Arthur Gajarsa noted in
his concurring opinion in Seagate, the doctrine has no basis in the
text or legislative history of the various Patent Acts,6 nor is it
justified by other equitable remedies available under title 35' or by
enhanced damages available under other titles of federal statutes.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.
on the availability of permanent
injunctions under 35 U.S.C. § 283 strongly counsels courts to
avoid unsupported statutory interpretations creating per se rules
that conflict with general principles of equity.9
Thus, ample support exists for changing the relation between
willfulness and enhanced damages. This Comment proposes a
flexible judicial approach that incorporates, but is not limited by,
willfulness. The House of Representatives has proposed a more
structured, rule-based approach in the Patent Reform Act of 2007,"o
which this Comment briefly examines. Part II of this Comment

4

35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
7 DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03[4][b][iii] (2007). Chisum

specifically notes:

Whether the purpose of an increased damage award should be
exemplary (i.e. to punish and deter flagrant acts of patent infringement)
or compensatory (i.e. to compensate the patent owner for
immeasurable expenses and losses) is a longstanding controversy in the
law. Perhaps the best view is that increased awards combine both
purposes.
Id.
6 See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1377-78 (Gajarsa & Newman, JJ., concurring)
(explaining the text and legislative history of several early Patent Acts).
7 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000) (federal patent statutes).
8 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
'Id. at 1841.
10

Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (as passed by House,

Sept. 10, 2007). It must be noted that if both the Senate and House pass a
compromise bill containing H.R. 1908's enhanced damages language, and the
President signs it into law, the proposed flexible judicial solution and many of
the premises on which it is based are moot. At the time of writing, however, the
full Senate has not considered any patent reform bills.
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presents the historical background of § 284 and the willfulness and
enhanced damages doctrines up to and including Seagate. Part III
presents arguments as to why the enhanced damages doctrine
should be changed. Finally, in Part IV, the two proposed
approaches are discussed and briefly compared.
II. BACKGROUND

The guiding principle of U.S. patent law is that a patentee shall
disclose its invention to the public in exchange for a right to
prohibit others from making, using, or selling (collectively
"practicing") the claimed invention during the twenty-year term of
the patent." A patentee is entitled to certain remedies when others
practice the claimed invention during the patent term. The
patentee may recover the actual monetary damages incurred as a
result of the infringement. 2 The patentee also may be entitled to
one or more equitable remedies, including an injunction
prohibiting the infringer from practicing the claimed invention,
attorney's fees for actions brought to enforce the patentee's rights,
and enhancement of the actual damages award."
A. History ofEnhancedDamages under Title 35
Although several patent statutes were enacted by Congress
from 1790 to 1792, the Patent Act of 1793 was the first to include
a provision for enhanced damages.14 Specifically, the Act required
that the infringer shall pay damages of "a sum, that shall be at least
equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has usually
sold or licensed to other persons."" One historian has theorized
" 35 U.S.C. § 154(a).

§ 284.
Id. §§ 283-85. Section 284 allows the court to enhance the actual damages
award by increasing it up to a factor of three, which is commonly known as
"treble damages." Id. § 284.
14 See Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of
the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 58-62
(2001).
15Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836); see also
121d.
'3

EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS:
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 1798-1836, 481 (Rothman

1998) (reprinting the text of the Patent Act of 1793 in its entirety in app. VIII).
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that this provision was the result of lobbying by Joseph Barnes, a
well-known attorney." Barnes believed that most jury members,
due to their ignorance of patent policy goals, would be
disrespectful of patent rights and inclined to minimize damages
awards to discourage patentees from bringing suits against alleged
infringers." If Barnes' writings did influence this legislation, then
the initial purpose of enhanced damages was at least partially
compensatory.
One difficulty arose when the courts narrowly interpreted the
language of the Patent Act of 1793 to require that defendants make
and use a patented invention in order to be held liable for
infringement.'" This interpretation generally made it more difficult
The Patent Act of 1800
for patentees to recover damages."
liability for anyone who
by
imposing
addressed this difficulty
"shall make, devise, use or sell" the patented invention,2 0 thereby
making damages more readily available to patentees. At the same
time, however, this legislation capped the enhancement of damages
available to patentees to "a sum equal to three times the actual
damage sustained."2 1
Nevertheless, the early U.S. patent system continued to be
plagued by a variety of complaints, including the prevalence of
fraud upon the Patent Office, the ease at which patents were
granted, and the frequency of litigation involving overlapping

16WALTERSCHEID, supra note 15, at 209.

" Id. at 210 ("[It] is a well-known fact, that the people in the remote parts of
the states, for want of right information, are opposed to all patent rights ...
[and] a jury of them would bring in a verdict of one dime damages in favor of
the patentee, as an indication for him, not to visit them again." (emphasis in
original)).
18 Powers & Carlson, supra note 14, at 62; see also Patent Act of 1793 § 5
(providing for damages against anyone who "shall make, devise and use, or sell
the thing so invented").
19 Jon E. Wright, Comment, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced
Damages-Evolution andAnalysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 97, 100 (2001).
20 Patent Act of 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38 (repealed 1836); see also
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 15, at 490 (reprinting the text of the Patent Act of
1800 in its entirety in app. XI).
21 Patent Act of 1800
§ 3.
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patent rights.22 All of these complaints were addressed by the
Patent Act of 1836.23 The force behind this legislation was Senator
John Ruggles, a former Maine Supreme Court justice and aspiring
patentee with a strong interest in mechanics and engineering.24
The Act repealed earlier patent laws, established the patent
examination system that remains in effect today, and replaced the
mandatory treble damages provisions of the Patent Acts of 1793
and 1800.25 The revised damages provision in the Patent Act of
1836 stated that "it shall be within the power of the court to render
judgment for any sum above the amount found by such verdict ...
not exceeding three times the amount thereof, according to the
circumstances of the case."26
Thus, in a span of forty-three years, Congress converted treble
damages from a statutory minimum to a statutory maximum. Two
factors may have influenced this change. First, early U.S. courts
admittedly were more liberal in upholding patent rights than their
English counterparts, especially in regards to upholding patent
validity.2 7 Congress recognized the problem that this judicial
tendency posed, especially in conjunction with the low quality of
patents that issued from a process based on registration rather than
examination.28 Second, there was political tension in the 1836
Congress between the general principle that monopolies were
strongly disfavored and the specific principle that innovation
22

WALTERSCHEID, supranote 15, at 422-23.

23 Id.

Id. at 421.
Wright, supra note 19, at 100.
26 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123
(current version at 35
U.S.C. § 284 (2000)).
27 See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 15, at 367-68 ("[I]t has always been the
course of the American courts to construe these patents fairly and liberally, and
not to subject them to over-nice and critical refinements." (quoting Ames v.
Howard, 1 F. Cas. 755, 756 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833))). The opinion in Ames was
written by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story who, in his other capacity as
circuit court judge, presided over seventeen of the fifty-eight known patent cases
between 1793 and 1835. Id. at 359.
28
Id. at 427; see also id at 424 ("A considerable portion of all the patents
granted are worthless." (quoting Senate Report Accompanying S. 239, 24th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 28, 1836) [hereinafter "Ruggles' Report"])).
24
25
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should be rewarded by the monopoly conferred by a patent.2 9
These two factors motivated Congress to provide "a check upon
the granting of patents," issuing them only for truly novel and
useful inventions, thereby "put[ting] an end to litigation before it
begins."" While the Patent Act of 1836's provision for an
examination-based system addressed the "front-end" issue of
patent quality,31 Congress may have reasonably intended the
limitation of damages to provide a complementary counterbalance
to the "back-end" issue of liberal judicial interpretation of patent
rights.
Although Congress removed the requirement for courts to
enhance awards of actual damages when infringement was found,32
it provided no guidance for the new judicial discretion that it
conferred." Likewise, no clear rationale for the new damages
provision is evident from the legislative history. While one of
Senator Ruggles' main goals for the new patent laws as a whole
was to prevent "piracy or fraud" of "American ingenuity and
intellect,"34 other members of Congress viewed rewarding
invention as the primary purpose of the patent laws.35
Even after the enactment of the Patent Act of 1836, a patentee
was faced with a choice of trying to recover either actual damages
as a remedy at law or, as incident to a claim for injunctive relief,
the infringer's profits as a remedy in equity." In response to this
29 See id. at 430 ("[M]onopolies were the bugaboo of the Jacksonians."); id at
432 (noting that the Jacksonians in Congress believed that the "primary role of
the patent system was to reward innovation"). The "Jacksonians" were political
of U. S. President Andrew Jackson.
supporters
30
Id. at 425 (quoting Ruggles' Report, supra note 28).
31

Id.

Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836) (requiring
infringer to pay damages of "a sum, that shall be at least equal to three times the
price, for which the patentee has usually sold or licensed to other persons").
3 See Wright, supra note 19, at 101.
34 Powers & Carlson, supra note 14, at 64 (quoting Senate Report
Accompanying S. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 28, 1836)).
3 WALTERSCHEID, supra note 15, at 431 ("[T]he Jacksonians [in Congress]
... believed that a central role of [the patent] system was properly rewarding
inventors for their efforts.").
36 CHISUM, supra note 5, § 20.02[1][d] (citing Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S.
64, 68-69 (1876)).
32
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perceived shortcoming, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1870
which expanded available equitable remedies to include the
patentee's actual damages. Courts were often reluctant, however,
to allow recovery of both lost profits and actual damages,
preferring to limit the award of actual damages to cases in which
financial injury to the patentee was greater than the profits made
by the infringer." This rule was motivated at least in part by the
need to adequately compensate the patentee, even to the extent of
enhancing the actual damages.39
Two Patent Acts from the mid-twentieth century have shaped
the award of enhanced damages to a lesser extent. The Patent Act
of 1946" was the first to require the "reasonable royalty" standard
to be used to measure damages, 41 which affects the ultimate
amount resulting from any enhancement. The Patent Act of 195242
made non-substantive changes to the enhanced damages provision
from the Patent Act of 183643 to create the current § 284:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event
less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court....
[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed.4

37 id.
38 Id. (quoting Birdsall,93 U.S.
at 69).
3 See Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1886) (noting that the
Patent Act of 1870 "authorizes the court sitting in equity to award and to treble
any damages that the plaintiff has sustained in excess of the defendant's
profits"); Marsh v. Seymour, 97 U.S. 348, 360 (1877) ("Damages of a
compensatory character may be allowed to a complainant in an equity suit,
where it appears that the business of the infringer was so improvidently
conducted that it did not yield any substantial profits, as in the case before the
court.").
40 Patent Act of 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284

(2000)).
Wright, supra note 19, at 100 (citing S. REP. No. 79-1503, at 1387 (1946)).
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 29, § 284, 66 Stat. 792, 813 (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 284).
43 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
"435 U.S.C. § 284.
41

42
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Consistent with prior legislation regarding enhanced damages, the
legislative history of the 1952 Act offers no additional information
about the purposes of the enhanced damages provisions of § 284.45
In summary, the current § 284 represents the evolutionary
product of numerous Patent Acts enacted over a period of more
than 200 years. None of the Patent Acts enacted during this
period, however, articulate any specific criteria for awarding
enhanced damages.4 6
Furthermore, their legislative histories
provide no significant guidance on criteria or purposes for such
awards.
B. Emergence of the Federal Circuit's Willfulness Doctrine
In the absence of guidance from the text and legislative
histories of the various Patent Acts,4 7 it was left to the courts to
develop an enhanced damages doctrine. Prior to the establishment
of the Federal Circuit and its jurisdiction over appeals from patent
infringement cases,4 8 one of the principal cases dealing with the
issue of enhanced damages was Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver
Tank & Manufacturing Co.49 In this case, Union Carbide sued
manufacturer Lincoln and end-user Graver, respectively, for
making and using several variants of a product that ultimately were
found to infringe Union Carbide's patent."o The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals first reversed the district court by finding that
Lincoln had not infringed willfully." A key factor in this finding
was that Lincoln relied on the advice of patent counsel in trying to
avoid infringing the claims of the patent. 52 Next, the court found
45 See Powers & Carlson, supra note 14, at 66 (citing S. REP. No. 82-1979, at
29-30
(1952), and H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 29-30 (1952)).
46
Ic. at 67.
47
Supra Part II.A.
48 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)
(2000).
49 282 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1960).
5o According to the procedural history, various issues in this
case had been
litigated for fifteen years before reaching the Seventh Circuit, including two
hearings before the Supreme Court. Id. at 655-56.
5' Id. at 663 ("Neither do we think on this record that Lincoln can properly be
... characterized as a conscious and wilful infringer when it acted under the
advice of equally experienced and competent counsel.").
52 id
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that the district court's award of enhanced damages not explicitly
based on the finding of willful infringement was improper because
such damages should have been accounted for in the actual
damages awarded under a reasonable royalty approach." The
court noted that "it is only on the basis of conscious and willful
infringement that exemplary or punitive damages are allowed in
addition to those which are compensatory."5 4 For twenty-three
years, Graver Tank was the principal case supporting the
proposition that a patentee could not obtain an award of enhanced
damages unless the infringer willfully copied the patented
invention."
After the creation of the Federal Circuit, one of the court's first
cases that dealt with the issue of enhanced damages was
In
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co."
Underwater Devices, the court held that when "a potential
infringer has actual notice of another's patent rights, he has an
affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not
he is infringing."" Furthermore, the court held that failure to
comply with this affirmative duty was sufficient to support a
finding of willfulness." The court found that because defendant
Morrison-Knudsen did not seek advice from competent patent
counsel in a timely manner, it failed to comply with this
affirmative duty and thus acted in "willful disregard of [the]
5
Id. at 675. The reasonable royalty is the statutory minimum of damages to
which the patentee is entitled if infringement is found. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
It is intended to represent the expected result of a hypothetical license
negotiation between the patentee and a willing potential user of the patented
invention, on the date that the infringement began. See CHISUM, supra note 5,
§ 20.03[3].
54 Graver Tank, 282 F.2d at 675.
5 See Powers & Carlson, supra note 14, at 69 n.95 (listing numerous cases
decided between 1960 and 1983 that cite Graver Tank for that proposition).
56 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
5 Id. at 1389.
Prior to the Underwater Devices opinion, several regional
circuits also incorporated "affirmative duty" requirements in their patent
jurisprudence. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 14, at 75-76. The affirmative
duty standard of Underwater Devices was criticized in Seagate as being
negligence-like culpability insufficient to constitute willfulness. In re Seagate
Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
58 UnderwaterDevices, 717 F.2d
at 1390.
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patents."" Based on this finding, the Federal Circuit held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by trebling the actual
damages award.60
The Federal Circuit also addressed the relation between
enhanced damages and willful infringement in Beatrice Foods Co.
v. New England Printing& Lithographing Co.6 1 The court stated
"it is well-settled that enhancement of damages must be premised
on willful infringement or bad faith."62 The court expressed
concern that awarding enhanced damages for compensatory
purposes would cause plaintiffs to seek enhanced damages
whenever a defendant failed to keep proper sales records for an
allegedly infringing product."
Taken together, Underwater
Devices and Beatrice illustrate the Federal Circuit majority rule
requiring willfulness to justify an award of enhanced damages'
because of their primarily punitive purpose.
Notwithstanding the assertions in the above cases, several
Federal Circuit cases continue to support the proposition that
willfulness is not required to sustain enhanced damages.6 5 Several
of these cases rely on the principle that awarding enhanced
damages under § 284 has a purpose that is at least partially
compensatory.6 6 One of the most thorough discussions of the
59 Id.
60 id.

923 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1578 (citing Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control U.S.A., Inc., 775 F.2d
268,
277 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
6 Id. at 1580.
64 In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa
& Newman, JJ., concurring) (citing CHISUM, supra note 5).
65 See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819
F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
("Whether or not 'willfulness' is found, the court has authority to consider the
degree of culpability of the tortfeasor."); Sherman Indus., Inc. v. Proto-Vest,
Inc., 732 F.2d 168 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (unpublished table decision) ("Damages
should be increased where necessary to afford full compensation for
infringement."), quoted in Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1379 n.1; Stickle v. Heublein,
Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that increasing the award of
damages "adequate to compensate for infringement" is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court).
66 See SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1468
(Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[E]nhancement of damages ... has the secondary benefit of
61

62
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relation between culpability and the purposes of enhanced damages
is found in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.67 In Rite-Hite, rather than
merely equating willfulness and enhanced damages, Judge Pauline
Newman stated:
"[W]illfulness" thus reflects a threshold of culpability in the act of
infringement that, alone or with other considerations of the particular
case, contributes to the court's assessment of the consequences of
patent infringement.

. .

. Whether or not "willfulness" is found, the

court has authority to consider the degree of culpability of the
tortfeasor.68

In this approach, "willfulness" is used to describe a range of
culpability for which the court may consider awarding enhanced
damages." Regardless of culpability, the court must "balance
equitable concerns as it determines whether and how to
recompense the successful litigant."" Thus, Judge Newman's
approach incorporates the infringer's culpability and equitable
principles in determining enhanced damages, which have both
compensatory and deterrent purposes.7'
The Federal Circuit's opinion in SRI International, Inc. v.
Advanced Technology Laboratories,Inc.72 also illustrates a nontrivial relationship between willfulness and enhanced damages

quantifying the equities as between patentee and infringer."); King Instruments
Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 951 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that "[t]he
problem of inadequate compensation when damages are based on a reasonable
royalty has been expressly recognized in several cases"); Rite-Hite, 819 F.2d at
1126 ("The measure of damages . .. provides an opportunity for the trial court to
balance equitable concerns as it determines whether and how to recompense the
successful litigant." (quoting S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.,
781 F.2d 198, 201 (Fed. Cir. 1986))); see also supra notes 18-19 and
accompanying text (noting the compensatory purpose that influenced the first
enhanced damages statute enacted as part of the Patent Act of 1793).
67 819 F.2d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
68
Id. at 1126.
69 See id. at 1125-26 (" 'Willfulness' in infringement, as in life, is not an allor-nothing trait, but one of degree. It recognizes that infringement may range
from unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or reckless, disregard of a
patentee's legal rights.").
70 Id. at 1126 (citing S.C. Johnson, 781 F.2d at 201).
7' Id.
72

127 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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under § 284.73 The court first defined " 'willful infringement' . . .
[as] the term designating behavior for which enhanced damages
may be assessed." 74 The court went on to state that when willful
infringement or bad faith has been found, the remedy of enhanced
damages serves not only as a punishment and deterrent but also
addresses the equitable issues between patentee and infringer."
In King Instruments Corp. v. Perego," the Federal Circuit
reviewed a district court ruling that awarded enhanced damages
without a finding of willfulness. The appellate court noted that
"[t]he problem of inadequate compensation when damages are
based on a reasonable royalty has been expressly recognized in
several cases."7 In such situations, courts have the discretion to
award damages greater than a reasonable royalty when plaintiffs
are not able to prove direct and foreseeable damages.79 Similarly,
in State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc.,so the Federal
Circuit noted that a finding of willfulness was sufficient for, but
did not compel, an award of enhanced damages."1
In summary, there has been a longstanding conflict in Federal
Circuit jurisprudence as to whether a finding of willfulness is
necessary or merely sufficient for awarding enhanced damages
under § 284. This conflict turns, at least in part, on whether the
purpose of enhanced damages is compensatory or punitive. As one
patent law scholar has noted, perhaps the best view of this conflict
is that enhanced damages awards serve both purposes.82

73 Id. at 1469 ("The principal considerations in enhancement of damages are
the same as those of the willfulness determination, but in greater nuance as may
affect the degree of enhancement.").
74 Id. at 1464 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 1468 (citing S.C. Johnson, 781 F.2d at 201).
76 65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
77 Id. at 945-46. The Federal Circuit did not address the willfulness finding
on appeal. Id.
7
1 d. at 951 n.6.
79
Id
80 948 F.2d 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
81 Id. at
1576.
82 CHISUM, supra
note 5.
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C. The Modern Nexus-Seagate
These conflicting lines of Federal Circuit willfulness cases
found a nexus in Seagate. Plaintiffs Convolve, Inc. ("Convolve")
and Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT") sued
defendant Seagate Technology, L.L.C. ("Seagate"), alleging
willful infringement of three patents." Shortly after receiving the
complaint, Seagate received three separate written opinions from
outside counsel Gerald Sekimura indicating that the patents were
likely to be invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed by Seagate.84
Seagate notified Convolve and MIT of its intention to rely on these
opinions as a defense to willfulness and disclosed Sekimura's work
product."
The plaintiffs, however, moved for discovery of
communications on this issue between Seagate and its outside
litigation counsel, who operated independently from opinion
counsel Sekimura."6 The trial court concluded that Seagate waived
its attorney-client privilege and work-product confidentiality for
all counsel on the issue of willfulness by invoking Sekimura's
opinions as a defense, and ordered Seagate to produce documents
and testimony as requested." After the trial court refused to certify
an interlocutory appeal, Seagate filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus with the Federal Circuit, which ordered an en banc
hearing on the petition."
Before addressing the extent of waiver of attorney-client
privilege and attorney work-product confidentiality upon
invocation of the opinion-of-counsel defense, the court addressed
its willfulness doctrine. After analyzing various federal statutes
and Supreme Court cases related to areas outside of title 35, the
court held that "proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced
damages requires at least a showing of objective recklessness.""
Furthermore, because the Seagate court determined that the dutyof-care standard established in Underwater Devices sets a lower
83

In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87

Id. at 1366-67.
Id. at 1367.
89
Id. at 1371.
88
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threshold for willfulness that is closer to negligence, it explicitly
overruled that case.90
The court went on to establish a two-part test for willfulness.
First, a patentee "must show by clear and convincing evidence that
the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent."'
If this
threshold is met, then the patentee "must also demonstrate that this
objectively-defined risk ... was either known or so obvious that it
should have been known to the accused infringer" to justify a
finding of willfulness. 92 This second, subjective prong establishes
that actual or constructive knowledge is a necessary element of
objective recklessness which itself is required for a finding of
willfulness." This higher threshold of culpability is likely to result
in fewer findings of willfulness and, consequently, fewer awards of
enhanced damages under the current Federal Circuit doctrine.
The opinion articulating this new standard was joined by the
entire panel, but two concurring opinions were issued by Judge
Newman and Judge Gajarsa.94 Judge Newman's opinion pointed
out, inter alia, the failure of the court to articulate any criteria for
the objective part of the willfulness test, and suggested "the
standards of fair commerce" should be a guideline for these
criteria.95 The lengthy concurring opinion by Judge Gajarsa,
however, took the majority to task for not removing the graft of
willfulness onto § 284.96 Judge Garjarsa's opinion makes a strong
argument for reforming the role of willfulness in the determination
of enhanced damages. This argument is based on a combination of
an analysis of the text and legislative history of the Patent Acts97
and comparisons of § 284 to other equitable remedies available
Id.
91 Id
90
92

Id.

9 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "constructive

knowledge" as "[k]nowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should
have, and therefore that is attributed by law to [that] person").
94 See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1376-84 (Gajarsa & Newman, JJ., concurring); id
at 1384-85 (Newman, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring).
96
Id. at 1377 (Gajarsa & Newman, JJ., concurring).
97 See supra Part II.A for a similar but more detailed historical reprise.
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under title 35 and with other enhanced damages statutes outside of
title 35.

III. ANALYSIS
First, this section analyzes and expands the arguments
presented by Judge Gajarsa in his concurring opinion in Seagate.
This section next examines the Federal Circuit's enhanced
damages doctrine in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in eBay.
Finally, this section briefly analyzes the Federal Circuit's enhanced
damages doctrine in the context of tort theory.
A. EnhancedDamages Outside of Title 35
Several enhanced damages statutes outside of title 35 illustrate
the anomalous nature of the Federal Circuit's enhanced damages
doctrine under § 284. Indeed, in several of these statutes, Congress
has explicitly stated both the purpose of enhanced damages and the
necessity of finding willfulness as a predicate for such awards.99
Courts expect such clear statements from Congress when limiting
recovery for patent infringement."oo Conversely, statutes lacking
clear statements generally have been interpreted as giving courts
broad equitable discretion to award enhanced damages on a caseby-case basis."o'
1. Copyright Law
Under the Copyright Act, copyright owners can elect to receive
statutory damages in lieu of actual damages for infringement of
their copyrights.' 2 If the owner so elects and is able to prove that
the infringement was "willful," the trial court has discretion to
enhance the award of statutory damages up to a maximum amount
98 See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1379-81 (Gajarsa & Newman, JJ., concurring)
(analyzing availability of prejudgment interest under § 284); id. at 1381-83
(analyzing other enhanced damages statutes).
99 See infra Part III.A. 1-2.
1oo See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653 (1983) ("When
Congress wished to limit an element of recovery in a patent infringement action,
it said so explicitly."); cf Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468
(2001) ("Congress ... does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.").
'0 See infra Part III.A.2-3.
102 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000).
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of $150,00.103 Although the term "willful infringement" is not
defined in the statute, it has been interpreted as reckless disregard
of infringement risk.1 " It is important to note that the copyright
laws contain no provisions similar to § 284 that allow discretionary
enhancement of damages based on general equitable principles.
Thus, by express language, Congress has made willfulness a
necessary condition for awarding enhanced damages under
copyright law, and courts rely upon that express language when
making such awards."o'
2. TrademarkLaw
The trademark statutes provide for enhanced damages in two
distinct ways. First, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) provides for discretionary
awards of enhanced damages based on general equitable
principles:
In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, according to the
circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as
actual damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the court
shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either
inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enterjudgment
for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the
circumstances of the case.10 6

Although not identical to § 284, the language of § 1117(a) has
been interpreted to embody the same equitable principlesdiscretion, flexibility, and justice-that are implicit in § 284.o7

Id. § 504(c)(2).
F.3d at 1370 (citing Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262
F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Willfulness in [the context of statutory damages
for copyright infringement] means that the defendant 'recklessly disregarded'
the possibility that 'its conduct represented infringement.' ")).
105 See Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that
enhanced damages are not available under the statutory election of § 504(c)(1)
but only under § 504(c)(2) which requires a showing of willfulness as condition
for such an award).
'06 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (emphasis added).
107 See Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int'l, Inc., 200 F.3d
358, 369 (5th Cir. 2000)
("The goal behind §§ 1116 and 1117 remedies is to achieve equity between or
among the parties. . . . Because each case presents a different set of facts and
circumstances, a case-by-case evaluation is warranted to determine the nature of
the infringing conduct and its adverse effects, if any, on the plaintiff.").
1o3

104Seagate, 497
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In addition, a specific exception to the flexible, equity-based
principles of § 1117(a) is provided in § 1117(b).'os This statute
mandates trebling actual damages upon finding a trademark
infringer "intentionally us[es] a mark or designation, knowing such
mark or designation is a counterfeit mark ... in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services.""
The knowledge and intent requirements of § I 117(b) are analogous
to the "willfulness" requirement under § 284."o The fact that such
behavior was specifically carved into a mandatory exception
demonstrates that Congress did not intend for willfulness to be an
implicit requirement for enhanced damages under § 1117(a).
Thus, at a minimum, the Federal Circuit's interpretation of similar
language in § 284 as including such an implicit requirement is in
tension with trademark law.
3. FairCredit ReportingAct
One of Congress's stated purposes in passing the Fair Credit
Reporting Act' was to "insure that consumer reporting agencies
exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and
a respect for the consumer's right to privacy."ll 2 Consistent with
this purpose, two statutory provisions exist for governing awards
of damages in civil actions for violations of credit reporting
statutes. In the case of a negligent violation, the successful
plaintiff is entitled to actual damages and reasonable attorney's
fees."' The courts also have discretion to assess punitive damages
against anyone who "willfully fails to comply with any
15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).
109 Id. As used in this statute, the term "counterfeit" is defined, inter alia, as
"a counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal register in the United
States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or services sold, offered for
sale, or distributed and that is in use, whether or not the person against whom
relief is sought knew such mark was so registered." Id. § 11 16(d)(1)(B)(i).
110 See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, 66 F.3d 1211, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
("Willfulness of infringement is a question of fact, for it includes elements of
intent, reasonableness, and belief."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1630 (8th ed.
2004) ("Willfulness does not necessarily imply malice, but it involves more than
just knowledge.").
'1 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x.
112Id. § 1681(a)(4).
3
11 Id. § 1681o(a).
108
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requirement imposed under this subchapter."ll 4 Congress's explicit
statements of the purpose of enhanced damages and the
requirement for willfulness to justify enhanced damages awards
differ significantly from § 284, and call into question the Federal
Circuit's reading of an implicit willfulness requirement in § 284
without any such legislative guidance as to purpose.
B. Pre-JudgmentInterest under 35 U.S. C. § 284
In General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.,"' the Supreme Court
interpreted the conditions for which pre-judgment interest may be
awarded under § 284 upon a finding of infringement." 6 The issue
facing the Court was whether Congress intended the Patent Act of
1946 to codify the common-law doctrine on pre-judgment interest
known as the Duplate standard-this doctrine included several
enumerated conditions for which an award of pre-judgment interest
was not available." 7
The Court noted that because Congress chose statutory
language distinct from the common-law language of Duplate, there
was no basis to infer that the new statutory provision merely
codified the Duplate standard."' Furthermore, the Court compared
the language of § 284 with the statutory language restricting the
discretionary award of attorney's fees to "exceptional cases,""' and
concluded that § 284 allowed a court to award interest and costs at
its discretion. The Court supported this conclusion of presumed
legislative intent by noting that "[w]hen Congress wished to limit
an element of recovery in a patent infringement action, it said so
explicitly." 2 0 The Court also held that award of pre-judgment
"l4Id.
§ 1681n(a)(2). The credit reporting statutes are contained within
chapter 41, subchapter III. See supra note I11 and accompanying text.

"' 461 U.S. 648 (1983).
116 Id. at 651. The statutory language at issue stated that claimants who were
successful in proving patent infringement were entitled to "interest and costs as
fixed by the court." Id. at 652 (citing Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, §§ 67, 70, 60
Stat. 778 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000)).
"' Id. at 651-52 (citing Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S.
448 (1936)).

"' Id. at 653.
"9

Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952)).

120 id
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remedy and not
the same rule of
of the enhanced
§ 284 leads to the
should not be

unnecessarily limited.122
C. The Tipping Point-eBayand PermanentInjunctions Under 35

U.S.C. § 283
The Supreme Court in eBay considered the conditions under
which a patentee is entitled to a permanent injunction against an
infringer under 35 U.S.C. § 283.123 The case arose when patentee
MercExchange sued website operators eBay and Half.com for
patent infringement after the parties failed to come to terms on a
license agreement.124 The district court awarded damages after
finding that eBay and Half.com infringed the patent but denied
permanent injunctive relief.125 The Federal Circuit reversed based
on its "general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions
against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances."126
In considering the appropriateness of the Federal Circuit's
general rule upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that district
courts have discretion to grant or deny injunctive relief in patent
infringement cases.127 Nevertheless, this discretion must be
Id. at 656-57.
In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa
& Newman, JJ., concurring); see supra note 44 and accompanying text to
compare the language of the pre-judgment interest and enhanced damages
provisions of § 284.
123 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006); see 35
U.S.C. § 283 (2000) ("[Courts] may grant injunctions in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on
such terms as the court deems reasonable.").
124 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
121

122

125 id

Id. (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339
(2005)). The Federal Circuit's rationale for this general rule was the statutory
right to exclude conferred by a patent. Id. at 1840 (citing eBay, 401 F.3d at
1338).
127 Id. at 1841.
126

158

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 9: 139

exercised according to the principles of equity that apply to all
types of cases.'28 Thus, a patentee's request for equitable relief
arising under § 283 is subject to the same four-factor test as
required for injunctive relief arising under any other statute.'29
In support of this holding, the Court drew an analogy between
§ 283 and the injunctive relief provision of the Copyright Act,
which provides that courts "may ... grant temporary and final
injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or
restrain infringement of a copyright."' 3 0 The Court cited previous
cases where it had refused to replace traditional equitable
considerations with a rule automatically granting an injunction
upon finding that a copyright was infringed. 3 ' A similar analogy
can be drawn between § 284 and the enhanced damages provision
of trademark law, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), under which a court may
exercise its discretion to enhance or reduce damages on a case-bycase basis.'32 Courts also have interpreted this statute based on
equitable considerations rather than applying per se rules.'3 3 Since
§ 284 contains permissive language very similar to the language of
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), under the eBay reasoning § 284 should also

Id. ("[T]he decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within
the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be
exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no
less than in other cases governed by such standards.").
129 See id. at 1839 (citing, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,
311-13 (1982)). When deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction
against a defendant's infringement, a court must balance whether (1) the
plaintiff has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) a remedy in
equity is warranted by the balance of hardships between the parties; and (4) the
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. Id.
130 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000).
131 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483,
505 (2001), and Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908));
see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994)
("[C]ourts may also wish to bear in mind that the goals of the copyright law ...
are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief when
parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of fair use.").
132 See supra note 106 and accompanying
text.
133 See supra note 107 and accompanying
text.
128
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be interpreted based on flexible equitable considerations rather
than as implying a rigid requirement for willfulness.'34
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts noted the
historical practice of granting injunctions against infringement in
the vast majority of patent cases.'
He observed, however, that
"[t]his historical practice . .. does not entitle a patentee to a

permanent injunction or justify a general rule that such injunctions
should issue.""6
Likewise, a historical practice-albeit an
inconsistent one"'-of awarding enhanced damages under § 284
upon a finding of willfulness should not justify a general rule
requiring willfulness as a predicate for such awards.
Numerous examples in the eBay opinions strongly advise
courts against classifications and categorizations.'
When viewed
together with the above arguments, ample evidence exists to
conclude that, at a minimum, the Federal Circuit's enhanced
damages doctrine is in tension with eBay.
D. The Tort of Negligent Infringement
The purpose served by awarding enhanced damages is an
important but controversial issue underlying the Federal Circuit's

134 Cf Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653 (1983) ("When
Congress wished to limit an element of recovery in a patent infringement action,
it said so explicitly.").
1 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ.,
concurring).
36
Id. (emphasis in original). Chief Justice Roberts went on to cite Roche
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865-67 (Fed. Cir.
1984), as a case in which the Federal Circuit applied equitable principles rather
than a general rule to determine whether an injunction should be granted. Id.
13 See supra notes 65-81 and accompanying text for examples of when the
Federal Circuit applied equitable principles or searched beyond willfulness to
determine whether enhanced damages should be awarded.
138 See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840-41 (noting that both the district court and
Federal Circuit erred in their categorical approaches to injunctive relief); id. at
1840 ("[T]raditional equitable principles do not permit such broad
classifications."); id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that court should

not "resort to categorical rules . . . in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief

in patent cases").
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Since patent
enhanced damages doctrine interpreting § 284.1'3
40
infringement is a strict liability tort,' even the most careful,
accidental infringer will be liable for actual damages sustained by
the patentee. As a result, an infringer's state of mind is only
relevant to the degree to which the actual damages are enhanced.14 '
The infringer's state of mind, or degree of culpability, can range
from accidental to deliberate.142 "Willful" is one degree within this
range, defined as acting in reckless disregard or in spite of "an
unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious
that it should be known."l 43 Awarding enhanced damages for
willful infringement serves to punish culpable behavior and deter
potential infringers from engaging in such behavior.'"
Between willful and purely accidental infringement exists a
spectrum of culpability for which punishment or deterrence may be
desirable but currently unavailable under the Federal Circuit's
enhanced damages doctrine. For instance, the two-part Seagate
test determines willful infringement first by assessing whether the
defendant acted in spite of an objectively high likelihood of
See supra Part II.B (describing Federal Circuit case law that conflicts over
whether enhanced damages have both compensatory and punitive purposes).
140 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) ("[W]hoever without authority makes,
uses,
or
States,
United
the
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within
the
of
the
term
during
invention
patented
any
States
United
the
imports into
patent therefor, infringes the patent."); see also Powers & Carlson, supra note
14, at 56-57 (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
141 See In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
("Because patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the
offense is only relevant in determining whether enhanced damages are
warranted.... Absent a statutory guide, we have held that an award of
enhanced damages requires a showing of willful infringement."); see also Read,
970 F.2d at 828 ("Willfulness is a determination as to a state of mind.").
142 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(" 'Willfulness' in infringement, as in life, is not an all-or-nothing trait, but one
of degree. It recognizes that infringement may range from unknowing, or
accidental, to deliberate, or reckless, disregard of a patentee's legal rights.").
143 Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
'"See Rite-Hite, 819 F.2d at 1126 ("The role of a finding of 'willfulness' in
the law of infringement is partly as ... an economic deterrent to the tort of
infringement-and partly as a basis for making economically whole one who
has been wronged.").
139
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infringement and, if so, by determining the defendant's subjective
awareness of that high likelihood.'4 5 By itself, the objective
inquiry describes behavior commonly known as negligence, which
is defined as "conduct which falls below the standard established
by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm."' 4 6 In cases of common negligence, the award of damages
serves the dual purposes of compensating the victim and deterring
tortfeasors from engaging in unreasonable behavior.'4 7
Arguably, it is equally desirable to deter potential infringers
from engaging in the unreasonable behavior defined by the first
prong of the Seagate test.148 While the threat of actual damages
and injunctive relief may provide some degree of deterrence,'4 9 the
145

Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.

146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
147 See Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (noting
the close relationship between compensatory and deterrent objectives of tort
law).
148 This deterrence function must be carefully distinguished or crafted to avoid
conflicting with a fundamental policy goal of the patent system of furthering the
dissemination of knowledge:
The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his
natural right in his discoveries.
Rather, it was a reward, an
inducement, to bring forth new knowledge. The grant of an exclusive
right to an invention was the creation of society-at odds with the
inherent free nature of disclosed ideas-and was not to be freely given.
Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge ...
justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly.
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966) (citing an 1813
letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson). Any deterrence function
must avoid disturbing the flow of knowledge embodied in patented inventions,
which may lead to the discovery of new breakthroughs or simply incremental
improvements, thereby "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful arts."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Instead, deterrence is properly focused on the
negligent commercial acts proscribed by U.S. patent law including the making,
using, and selling of the patented invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
149 The Supreme Court's decision in eBay arguably has reduced the potential
deterrence effect of injunctive relief under 35 U.S.C. § 283 by not making it
"automatically" available. See supra Part III.C. According to a pre-eBay
empirical study, however, only 7.9% of patent infringement suits resolved over a
three-year period resulted in permanent injunctions being granted as part of a
settlement, judgment, or verdict. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are
Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and
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Federal Circuit has recognized the importance of enhanced
damages to serve this deterrent function."'o Yet the Federal
Circuit's current enhanced damages doctrine subjects the
"negligent infringer" who meets only the first prong of the Seagate
test to the same actual damages award under strict liability as the
careful, accidental infringer."' This approach is not likely either to
deter potential negligent infringers from engaging in the
unreasonable behavior or to motivate them to observe a reasonable
standard of care.' 52 Instead, the Federal Circuit's enhanced
damages doctrine, when applied with the new Seagate two-prong
Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 237, 280 (2006). As for
actual damages, when awarded in the form of a reasonable royalty, their
statutory purpose is to "adequate[ly] compensate for the infringement." 35
U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, reasonable royalties may
exceed the profit margin or even the sales price of the infringing product. See
State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983). One empirical
study has shown, however, that the median reasonable royalty rate awarded by
courts is 10% of the sales price of the infringing product. Mark A. Lemley &
Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1991, 203032 (2007) (citing statistics from forty-seven judgments between 1982 and 2005).
Nevertheless, there is concern about courts' consistency when calculating
reasonable royalties. H.R. REP. No. 110-314, at 27 n.12 (noting examples of
large awards when courts utilized the "entire market value" standard to
determine a reasonable royalty). Actual damages also may be awarded for the
patentee's lost profits caused by the infringing product competing against the
patentee's product. Occasionally actual damage awards based on lost profits
have bankrupted the infringer. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Nies, J., dissenting). According to the
empirical study cited above, however, actual damages are awarded even less
frequently than permanent injunctions. See Kesan & Ball, supra, at 279. One
possible conclusion is that a blend of injunctive relief and enhanced damages,
applied in a flexible manner according to the circumstances of the case, provides
the optimum deterrence against infringement. See infra Part IV.B; infra note
150.
"s Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1574 (Nies, J., dissenting) ("[T]rebling damages is the
deterrent against deliberate infringement.").
'5' Cf In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(noting that "the duty of care announced in UnderwaterDevices ... is more akin
to negligence" and explicitly overruling that line of cases).
152 The Seagate court did not define a reasonable standard of care for the first
(objective) prong of the new test for willfulness that it articulated, expressly
reserving that question for future cases. Id. at 1371.
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willfulness test, may provide an incentive for potential infringers to
remain ignorant of the objectively high likelihood of infringement
that their behavior has created.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The previous sections laid the historical groundwork and
presented arguments for the need to reform the Federal Circuit's
enhanced damages doctrine. This section presents two solutions:
the legislative solution embodied in H.R. 190813 and a flexible
judicial solution that is consistent with the equitable principles
discussed in previous sections of this Comment.
A. H.R. 1908-A Statutory Solution
H.R. 1908, also known as the Patent Reform Act of 2007, was
passed by the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007.
The bill encompasses a broad spectrum of changes to United States
patent laws, including a provision that essentially codifies the
Federal Circuit's current enhanced damages doctrine.
The
proposed § 284(c)(1) provides: "A court that has determined that
the infringer has willfully infringed a patent or patents may
increase the damages up to three times the amount of damages
found or assessed under subsection (a) . ... "154 H.R. 1908 defines

"willful infringement" by three relatively narrow, enumerated
circumstances requiring a relatively high burden of proof. The
proposed § 284(c)(2) reads:
A court may find that an infringer has willfully infringed a patent only
if the patent owner presents clear and convincing evidence that(A) after receiving written notice from the patentee(i) alleging acts of infringement in a manner sufficient to give the
infringer an objectively reasonable apprehension of suit on such
patent, and
(ii) identifying with particularity each claim of the patent, each
product or process that the patent owner alleges infringes the patent,
and the relationship of such product or process to such claim, the
infringer, after a reasonable opportunity to investigate, thereafter
performed one or more of the alleged acts of infringement;
'

H.R. 1908, supra note 10, § 5.

154

id
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(B) the infringer intentionally copied the patented invention with
knowledge that it was patented; or
(C) after having been found by a court to have infringed that patent, the
infringer engaged in conduct that was not colorably different from the
conduct previously found to have infringed the patent, and that resulted
in a separate finding of infringement of the same patent.1

The italicized portions above indicate the degree of culpability
required to find willfulness under the proposed § 284. The text
appears to define "willfulness" as a state of mind more culpable
than "recklessness" by requiring the potential infringer to have
actual rather than merely constructive knowledge of a high
likelihood of infringement as required under the second prong of
the Seagate test.15 ' This definition is consistent with the intent of
the bill to "limit[] the permitted grounds for a finding of
Furthermore, even under permitted grounds
willfulness."'
willfulness must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence," a
burden of proof higher than the "preponderance of evidence"
standard that is used in most civil cases. By limiting the grounds
and increasing the burden of proof, H.R. 1908 will likely result in
fewer findings of willfulness in cases of infringement.
But what are the potential unintended consequences for
limiting willfulness findings? Under the Federal Circuit's current
enhanced damages doctrine, restrictions on willfulness necessarily
lead to reducing courts' ability to award § 284 enhanced damages
as an equitable remedy. By removing this lever of control, H.R.
1908 may have the unintended consequence of prompting courts to
grant other equitable remedies more frequently. In particular, the
eBay test gives courts significant discretion in deciding whether to
grant permanent injunctions against infringing conduct.'
Significant evidence exists to show that post-eBay courts often

15 Id. (emphasis added). The proposed § 284(c)(3) also incorporates several
willfulness limitations related to an accused infringer's good faith belief that the
patent at issue was invalid or unenforceable. Id.
15 H.R. REP. No. 110-314, at 28 n.20 (noting the subjective prong of the
Seagate willfulness test).

'5 Id. at 28.
158
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utilize this discretion to grant permanent injunctions.'" Since
similar discretion for awarding enhanced damages would be
seriously curtailed under H.R. 1908, more infringers may find
themselves cast from the "frying pan" of enhanced damages into
the "fire" of a permanent injunction if this bill is enacted into law.
B. Flexible JudicialSolution
As discussed in the previous sections, there is a need for a
more flexible enhanced damages doctrine that considers both the
degree of culpability of the infringer and the equitable concerns
between the two parties according to the circumstances of the
case.' Under this approach, a court would have the discretion to
enhance a damages award upon finding any degree of culpability
justifying deterrence, including negligence, willfulness (or
recklessness), intent, and malice (or bad faith).'"' In general, more
culpable behavior would tend to justify a court applying higher
multiplication factors to actual damages, subject to the statutory
limit. Unlike the current Federal Circuit enhanced damages
doctrine coupled with the Seagate standard for willfulness, this
approach would provide a deterrent for both willful and negligent
infringement behavior.
This general tendency to increase damages with culpability,
however, would be balanced by any equitable concerns between
1
See TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669-70
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (granting a motion for permanent injunction because plaintiff
would suffer irreparable harm in the form of lost market share if defendant, a
Compare
direct competitor, continued to sell the infringing product).
Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. vs. Buffalo Tech., Inc., 492
F. Supp. 2d 600, 607-08 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (granting a motion for permanent
injunction based on finding that plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if
defendant continued to sell infringing product, even though parties were not
competitors), with z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (denying a motion for permanent injunction, at least in part,
because plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm if defendant continued to sell
the infringing product, since parties were not competitors).
160 See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying
text.
161 Under this approach, "willfulness" defines one degree of
culpability
justifying enhanced damages, while in the current Federal Circuit enhanced
damages doctrine, "willfulness" defines the entire range of culpability for which
enhanced damages may be awarded.
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the parties. Courts would be given discretion to "consider the
balance of hardships between plaintiff and defendant" in
determining whether an equitable remedy is justified.162 One such
situation is when the infringer destroyed or failed to keep records
necessary for calculating actual damages that fully compensate the
patentee. 163 The court would be allowed to enhance the actual
damages beyond a level justified solely by the infringer's
culpability, again subject to the statutory limit. Another situation
is when a patentee's claim for injunctive relief passes the first three
factors of the eBay test but fails the fourth factor because the
public interest would be disserved by granting a permanent
injunction.1 " This situation would qualify as an equitable concern
that a court could consider in determining whether to award
enhanced damages under § 284.
Even if the patentee's claim passes all factors of the eBay test,
a court may decide that despite the fact that "the balance of
hardships between plaintiff and defendant [justifies] a remedy in
equity,"165 the proper equitable remedy is enhanced damages rather
than a permanent injunction. Consider the example cited in eBay
of an individual inventor who does not practice his patent but seeks
to license it to manufacturers.16 6 Assume that a manufacturer,
acting without culpability, has incorporated the invention into its
commercial product prior to being approached by the inventor with
the offer to license. Even though the manufacturer may face
hardship if a permanent injunction is granted, a court may
reasonably conclude that the individual inventor faces an even
greater hardship that justifies an equitable remedy under the third
factor of the eBay test. In such a case, an award of enhanced

eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839 (explaining the third factor of the four-factor test
for whether a permanent injunction should be granted, which the court held
should be used to interpret 35 U.S.C. § 283).
163 In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa
& Newman, JJ., concurring) (noting that it would be reasonable for a court to
grant a discretionary enhancement of damages in this situation).
'" eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
162

165 Id.
166 Id. at

1840.
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damages rather than a permanent injunction may be preferred by
both the individual inventor and the manufacturer." 7
The situations described above illustrate the advantages of a
flexible judicial solution to determining enhanced damages. In
contrast, H.R. 1908 provides even less judicial flexibility than the
Federal Circuit's current doctrine by strictly defining "willfulness"
and requiring it as a predicate for an enhanced damages award.
The situations described in this section also illustrate the
advantages of an integrated determination of the availability of the
complementary equitable remedies of enhanced damages under
§ 284 and injunctive relief under § 283. H.R. 1908 makes no
provision for linking equitable remedies available for patent
infringement.16 8 In contrast, H.R. 1908 narrows the range of
circumstances for which enhanced damages are available, which
may result in the unintended-and often undesired-consequence
of more frequent awards of injunctive relief under § 283. Thus, the
flexible judicial solution is preferable to H.R. 1908 for all the
reasons stated above.
A potential concern about the flexible judicial solution is that it
would be too flexible, giving courts too much discretion to award
enhanced damages and thereby creating unnecessary uncertainty
for potential defendants facing infringement litigation. Arguably,
however, at the core of this concern is the inadequacy and lack of
clarity of the Federal Circuit's pre-Seagate willfulness standard.169
The Federal Circuit's new standard for willfulness articulated in
Seagate provides a much stronger foundation on which to base
enhanced damages awards. 70 Furthermore, the two-part Seagate
standard allows a more granular determination of culpability, with
the objective part alone clearly defining a standard for "negligent
16 Cf Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1378 (Gajarsa & Newman, JJ., concurring)
(noting that in some cases "the district court might reasonably determine that
monetary relief in the form of enhanced damages is more appropriate than an
injunction").
168 See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 2 (as passed by
House, Sept. 10, 2007) (listing no proposed amendments to § 283).
169 H.R. REP. No. 110-314, at 28 (noting a number of Congressional concerns
with the pre-Seagatestandard for willfulness).

170 Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.

168
infringement.""'
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Thus, the Seagate standard gives courts clear

definitions of a broader range of culpable behavior from which the
court may enhance awards of actual damages based on traditional
equitable considerations, in the same manner as applied to
permanent injunctions.'72 Likewise, once Federal Circuit case law
fleshes out the objective part,7 3 the Seagate standard should
provide clearer notice for potential infringers as to what conduct is
likely to result in enhancement of actual damages awards.
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's recent Seagate opinion significantly
modified the standard for determining whether infringement of a
patent was willful. Although Seagate is notable for this new
willfulness doctrine, it is perhaps equally notable for failing to
reform the role of willfulness in the court's companion doctrine for
enhanced damages under § 284. Judge Gajarsa's concurring
opinion in Seagate presents strong arguments, analyzed and
augmented in this Comment, for reforming this doctrine. Whether
awards of enhanced damages are intended to serve a punitive or
compensatory purpose is a critical issue because it relates directly
to the degree of culpability-expressed as "willfulness"-required
to sustain such an award. As this Comment shows, neither the
texts nor the legislative histories of the various Patent Acts dating
back to 1793 give any meaningful guidance as to the purpose of
enhanced damages or whether willfulness should be an implicit

requirement.17 4
Nevertheless, meaningful guidance on these issues can be
gleaned from other statutes prescribing equitable remedies and
from cases interpreting these statutes. An analysis of other
enhanced damages statutes shows that traditionally Congress either
explicitly requires willfulness or else gives discretion to the courts
to award enhanced damages based on broad equitable principles.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006)
("[T]raditional equitable principles do not permit such broad classifications.").
'. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 ("We leave it to further cases to further develop
the application of this standard.").
174 See supra Part II.A.
171
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Judicial interpretations of the conditions under which other title 35
equitable remedies are available also demonstrate the anomalous
nature of the Federal Circuit's § 284 enhanced damages doctrine.
Of particular importance is the Supreme Court's recent eBay
decision that interprets the requirements for granting permanent
injunctions under § 283.
Taken together, the majority and
concurring opinions in eBay strongly counsel courts to avoid
unsupported statutory interpretations creating per se rules that
conflict with general principles of equity. Thus, at a minimum, the
Federal Circuit's § 284 enhanced damages doctrine is in tension
with eBay.
Two different solutions to satisfy this need for reform were
discussed. The first is a legislative initiative, H.R. 1908, that
attempts to address this established need by codifying some
aspects of the Federal Circuit's current willfulness and enhanced
damages doctrines. The proposed § 284 includes an explicit
requirement for willfulness as a predicate for enhanced damages
and a relatively narrow definition of what behavior constitutes
willfulness.
The second is a flexible judicial solution that
incorporates both the degree of culpability of the infringer and the
equitable concerns between the two parties, according to the
circumstances of the case. This solution provides a deterrent
function consistent with damages under tort theory and is fully
aligned with the eBay doctrine. In fact, as discussed in this
Comment, there are some significant advantages to allowing courts
to apply such a flexible judicial approach to make integrated,
coherent determinations for the set of equitable remedies available
for patent infringement. This approach is particularly appropriate
when coupled with a clearer, more granular standard for culpability
as articulated by the Federal Circuit in Seagate. While the
proposed statutory constraints may provide some certainty if
passed into law, there is a risk that they also may provoke
unintended consequences once applied by the courts-especially
the more frequent granting of permanent injunctions. For all of
these reasons, the flexible judicial solution is likely to provide a
more effective reform of the Federal Circuit's enhanced damages
doctrine than the statutory solution proposed in H.R. 1908.
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